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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL CHRISTENSEN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
WELDON S. ABBOTT, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
RESPONDENT Is BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Civil No. 15574 
Plaintiff-Appellant Christensen sued to enforce payment of 
the $111,000 promissory note of Defendant-Respondent Abbott and 
sought to recover $37,200 for the care for 200 head of Angus 
cattle, which had been purchased by Abbott from Christensen 
and which were involved in the joint ranching operation of the 
parties. 
Respondent Abbott pleaded as an affirmative defense an 
accord and satisfaction, which settled all accounts between the 
parties which involved their joint ranching venture. Both par-
ties admitted the joint venture being constituted by (1) the 
Abbott to Christensen note for the black Angus cattle purchase, 
and (2) the joint Christensen-Abbott purchase and operation of 
the Haslem ranch and other red cattle. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, 
without a jury. The court found that the Christensen-Abbott 
business venture had failed and that on April 28, 1976 the par-
ties had entered into an accord and satisfaction agreement, 
which covered a division of all property and debts of the joint 
venture. The court dismissed plaintiff's complaint with pre-
judice for no cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Affirmance of the judgment of the trial court after trial 
in this matter. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's state~ent of facts is confusing and arg~enta­
tive. Respondent sets forth this statement of relevant facts 
and the proofs of those facts as was made by both parties be-
fore the trial court, in accordance with the fundamental principle 
that respondent is entitled to every reasonable inference from 
chose facts which support the findings and judgment of the trial 
court. 
The Christensen-Abbott joint venture involved two separate 
business transactions, 11ith a continuing joint ranching opera-
tion. First, on March 6. 1974, Abbott purchased from Christens~ 
200 black Angus cattle. Abbott received a bill-of-sale (Exh.P-14 
and gave to Christensen his pro~issory note for $111,000 (Exh.P-1 
-2-
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Then, in April, 1974, Christensen and Abbott purchased 
the Haslem Blue Mountain Ranch with 250 red cattle for $703,500. 
The initial payment was $173,500, of which Christensen paid 
$85,000 and Abbott paid $88,500 with the understanding with the 
Haslems that the cattle were to be considered as fully paid for 
(R-40) . The balance of the purchase price was represented by 
the Christensen-Abbott promissory note to the Haslems for 
$529,500, payable in annual installments over ten years (Exh.P-35). 
The parties jointly received a bill-of-sale for the Haslem cattle 
(Exh.P-10), and Christensen immediately gave to Abbott a bill-of-
sale for the same cattle (Exh.P-11). 
The Angus cattle and the Haslem cattle were all placed on 
the Haslem ranch and BL~ range land, under the operation of 
Christensen, until April, 1976. It was agreed between Christensen 
and Abbott that they would each take half of the calf crop (R-168). 
The Haslems sued Christensen and Abbott to foreclose the 
delinquent mortgage (R-202,242), and in April, 1976 it became 
apparent to Christensen and Abbott that their ranching venture 
was a failure. They then agreed to conclude the joint venture 
and to settle their accounts, with the 250 red cattle being 
split, with 44 to Abbott and the remainder to Christensen, with 
an assignment to Abbott by Christensen of the latter's interest 
in the Haslem contract and an assumption by Abbott of the Haslem 
mortgage, including the delinquencies of $193,187.95 (Exh.P-35), 
less $20,000 paid on interest, or $173,187.95, plus accrued 
-3-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
interest. The Haslem assignment and assumption instrument 
(Exh.P-4) was prepared by Dennis Draney, the law partner of 
George Mangan, Christensen's attorney (R-291). Draney and 
Mangan each admitted (R-292,294) having a joint financial 
interest in the Haslem ranch, as they had contributed about 
$45,000 toward Christensen's part of the purchase down payment 
(R-294,295). 
The foregoing is a recital of admitted facts. The contro-
versy arises from the conflicting testimony of the parties as 
to their intention with respect to the Haslem red cattle, the 
black Angus cows, the assignment and assumption agreement (Exh. 
P-4), and the arrangement of the parties with regard to opera-
tion of the Haslem ranch. 
Abbott's testimony was that the parties always intended 
to own the ranch jointly, but that the 250 head of cattle pur-
chased therewith were to be property of Abbott and that in the 
operation of the Haslem property Christensen was to pay all 
costs of feeding and pasturing the cattle and to furnish all 
labor therefor (R-239) , and in return he was to receive and did 
in fact receive the proceeds of one-half of the calf crop 
(R-146, 155, 156 and 164). Abbott testified that the purpose 
and intent of the parties in the execution of the Haslem 
contract "Assignment and Assumption Agreement" (Exh.P-L..) was 
not only that he assume and pay the note in favor of Haslem, 
including all arrearages of interest, but also that his 
-4-
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promissory note to Christensen (Exh.P-1) would be cancelled 
and Abbott would own outright the 200 head of Angus cows (R-241-
243). This settlement was in consideration of the liabilities 
assumed by Abbott and further in consideration of the fact that 
Abbott received only 44 of the 250 head of cattle purchased 
with the Haslem property, and made certain payments to Christensen. 
(Exhs. 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9; R-239-40) 
Christensen testified that the agreement for operation of 
the Haslem ranch was that the parties were to be joint owners 
of the ranch and all of the cattle purchased therewith; that 
the parties were to share equally in all of the ranching expenses 
incident to grazing the cattle and were to share equally in the 
calf crop (R-168). In addition, Christensen testified that he 
was to receive a wage for managing the Haslem property (R-179). 
Christensen testified that the purpose and intent of the assign-
ment and assumption agreement (Exh.P-4) was only to settle the 
rights of the parties in the real property and their obligations 
under the note and mortgage, and he admitted that Abbott was to 
assume and pay all of the arrearages, both principal and interest, 
on the Haslem note (R-202,203). Christensen said that Abbott 
would be liable for one-half of all of the costs incurred in 
feeding and grazing the cattle during the time the parties were 
in possession of the Haslem ranch (R-202,203). 
-5-
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The evidence adduced by Christensen at the trial purports 
to show the total amounts expended in the joint ranching opera-
tion and the reasonableness of such expenditures. The expenses 
are not broken down as to the Angus cows and the other joint 
operations. 
After a two-day trial, Judge Sorensen gave a memorandum 
decision (R-40), stating: 
It would appear that, no matter what the 
business arrangement was between the 
parties prior to April 28, 1976, on that 
date both parties concluded the business 
had failed, and they therefore settled 
between them a division of the property 
and debts. The court finds that Exhibit 4 
covers only a part of that settlement. 
The court concludes that on April 28, 1976, 
there was an accord and satisfaction, and 
therefore finds no cause of action. 
The findings (R-41) and judgment (R-43) concluded that 
there was an accora and satisfaction, which settled between the 
parties a division of the property and the debts of their busi-
ness operation. Christensen's complaint for recovery on the 
$111.000 note and for care of the Angus cattle was dismissed. 
By the terms of the accord and satisfaction Abbott was to 
receive the 200 Angus cows and 44 head of the Haslem cows. The 
court necessarily concluded that Christensen was entitled to 
recover nothing for care and feeding prior to April 28, 1976, 
since the accord and satisfaction adjusted all accounts between 
the parties. Christensen wrongfully refused to deliver the 200 
-6-
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Angus cows to Abbott after April 28, 1976, and could not recover 
costs or services incurred because of his wrongful refusal to 
make delivery. 
ARGUMENT 
The only issue before this court is whether there was suffi-
cient credible evidence to support the trial judge's finding 
that there had been an accord and satisfaction between the par-
ties, which settled and divided the properties and debts of the 
joint Christensen-Abbott ranching operation. 
Appellant has attempted to obscure the issue by his con-
fusing recital of details of the ranching operation, all of 
which were resolved in the final settlement between the parties. 
The only writing involved in the settlement; that is, the 
assignment by Christensen and assumption of the Haslem contract 
by Abbott, was an instrument of transfer and as such it was 
only a part of the whole settlement agreement. Abbott's note 
to Christensen and any difference in what he did pay and what 
he might have owed for care of his Angus cattle were the only 
matters on which Christensen sued, and these matters were re-
solved by the whole final settlement. These were the trial 
court's findings after a two-day trial, where the details of 
the ranching operation and the procedure in settlement were 
fully examined. The review by this court should give the 
tr~ditional respect to the trial court's findings after trial. 
-7-
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POINT I. 
A COMPLETE, COMPREHENSIVE ACCORD AND SA TIS-
FACTION DIVIDING ALL OF THE PROPERTIES AND 
THE DEBTS OF THE JOINT VENTURE WAS MADE AND 
EXECUTED BY THE PARTIES. 
The Utah court in Browning v. Equitable Life Assurance 
Society (1937), 94 U.532, 72 P2d 1060, reh.den. 94 U.570, 80 
P2d 348, cited at 1 Am.Jur.2d 301, defined an accord and satis-
faction as: 
An accord is an agreement between parties, 
one to give or perform, the other to re-
ceive or accept, such agreed payment or 
performance in satisfaction of a claim. 
The "satisfaction" is the consu=ation of 
such agreement. There must be considera-
tion for the agreement. Settlement of an 
tmliquidated or disputed claim where the 
parties are apart in good faith presents 
such consideration. 
Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, Inc. (1977) (Utah), 
560 P2d 1383, 1386. citing to 1 Am.Jur.2d 301-302, gave this 
definition: 
An accord and satisfaciton is a method of 
discharging a contract, or settling a 
claim arising from a contract, by substi-
tuting for such contract or claim an agree-
ment thereof, and the execution of the 
substituted agreement. 
Smoot v. Checketts (1912), 41 U.211, 125 P.412, held that 
an accord and satisfaction is established, with good considera-
tion, where the debtor pays and the creditor accepts less than 
the full amount due on a disputed or unliquidated claim. 
-8-
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Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart Inc. (1966), 18 U2d 186, 
417 P2d 761, restated the definition of accord and satisfaction 
as in Browning, supra, and then reviewed the evidence before 
the trial court and affirmed that court's conclusion that the 
cashing of a check marked "payment in full" did not by itself 
constitute an accord. 
A series of Utah cases, including Bennett, supra, placed 
the burden of pleading and proof of accord and satisfaction on 
the party raising that affirmative defense. 
The Utah court in Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Building & Loan 
Association (1938), 94 U.97, 75 P2d 669, reaffirmed the Browning 
and Smoot cases, supra, and held that the party pleading an 
accord and satisfaction had the burden of proving that defense. 
Hintze v. Seaich (1968), 20 U2d 275, 437 P2d 202, held that 
the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction must be 
pleaded and proved by a preponderance of evidence. In Hintze 
there was no pleading of that affirmative defense, only an 
answer disputing the commission due under an oral employment 
agreement, and the court followed the Bennett case, in holding 
that the cashing of a check marked "payment in full" was not 
alone sufficient proof of a meeting of minds for an accord and 
satisfaction. 
Tates, Inc. v. Little America Refining Co. (1975)(Utah) 
535 P2d 1228, again involved a question of whether the debtor 
in cashing a check for less than the full amount alleged due 
-9-
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constituted an acceptance for an accord and satisfaction agree-
ment. The court placed the burden of proof on the party alleging 
the accord and satisfaction, citing to Hintze, supra. In Tates, 
the trial court found that there was no acceptance by the debtor 
of the lesser amount and thus no accord or satisfaction. The 
court, citing to !1emmott v. U.S. Fuel Co. (1969), 22 U2d 356, 
453 P2d 155, stated: 
On appeal we apply the traditional rules 
of review: we assume that the trial 
court believed those aspects of the evi-
dence which may be deemed to support his 
finding and judgment; and we survey the 
evidence in the light favorable thereto. 
Cannon, supra, is the most recent Utah accord and satis-
faction 23Se There the Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court's ruling that cashing a check for a lesser amount than 
due on an employment contract was not proof of an accord and 
satisfaction, citing to the Tates and Hintze cases, supra. 
The Utah cases have consistently held that the sufficiency 
of evidence of an agreement and the credibility of witnesses 
are the prerogatives of the trial court. In Paulsen v. Coombs 
(1953), 123 U.49, 253 P2d 621, the trial court was affirmed in 
finding that the party with the burden of proof had ~et that 
burden, citing Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Company 
(1952), 122 U.268, 248 P2d 692, and saying: 
The question of whether evidence is 
sufficient to be clear and convincing 
is primarily for the trial court; his 
finding should not be disturbed unless 
we must say as a matter of law that no 
one could reasonably find the evidence 
to be clear and convincing. 
-10-
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In Page v. Federal Security Insurance Co. (1958), 8 U2d 
226, 332 P2d 666, the Utah court states: 
The traditional and well established 
rule is: the fact trier, in this 
instance the jury, has the prerogative 
of judging credibility of witnesses and 
the weight to be given the evidence. 
Let us now apply the Utah case law to the Christensen v. 
Abbott facts and trial. The single issue of fact and law was 
pleaded by respondent in his affirmative defense of accord and 
satisfaction (R-7). The two-day trial was entirely devoted to 
proofs by respondent and rebuttal by appellant of respondent's 
allegation of accord and satisfaction. The trial court's 
finding, after hearing all of the evidence, was that there was 
an accord and satisfaction agreement between the parties (R-40), 
thus concluding that respondent had met his burden of proof. 
If there were any variance in the evidence, the trial court 
weighed that evidence and the credibility of the witnesses in 
finding for respondent. 
Appellant's statement of facts admits that two separate 
transactions made up the present dispute, these being (1) the 
Abbott purchase of the 200 black Angus cattle in consideration 
for Abbott's note to Christensen for $111,000 and (2) the 
Abbott-Christensen purchase of the Haslem ranch and red cattle, 
with the joint operation of these properties by Christensen. 
The proof was that the black Angus and the red Haslem 
cattle were all run on the Haslem ranch and on BLH winter and 
-11-
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summer ranges, depending on the season (R-276). The expenses 
of the whole operation were summarized by appellant in his 
accounting summaries(Exhs. P-31,32 and 33). 
A reading of the trial transcript shows complete and utter 
confusion, prolixity and prolifera of testimony regarding black 
and red cows. Judge Sorensen commented near the end of the 
trial that the case had not proceeded in an orderly manner, and 
counsel agreed (R-283). Judge Sorensen asked Christensen if 
"your business venture had flopped," if the business arrangement 
came to an end then, and if it were being wound up on April 28 
(1976), and Christensen agreed (R-304). 
Abbott testified that in the settlement of the joint ranch-
ing venture the distinction between black and red cows was not 
important and that the ranch equity and debts and all cattle, 
black or red, were considered by the parties in arriving at 
their settlement agreement (R-255,285). 
The trial court's Memorandum Decision (R-40) states: 
It would appear that, no matter what the 
business arrangement was between the parties 
prior to April 28, 1976, on that date both 
parties concluded the business had failed, 
and they therefore settled between them a 
division of the property and debts. The 
court finds that Exhibit 4 covers only a 
part of that settlement. 
The court concludes that on April 28, 1976, 
there was an accord and satisfaction, and 
therefore finds no cause of action. 
We submit that respondent proved an accord and satisfac-
tion, with settlement of all disputed transactions between the 
parties, by competent and credible evidence and testimony and 
-12-
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that the trial court's decision was entirely consistent with 
all of the Utah case law cited above. 
POINT II. 
THE HASLEN CONTRAC:' ASSIGNMENT AND ASSill1P-
TION AGREE!-fENT INSTRUMENT HAS ONE FACET ONLY 
OF THE COMPLETE ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 
A. THAT DOCill!ENT WAS NOT INTENDED BY THE PARTIES AS AN 
INTEGRATED OR FINAL AGREEHENT. 
The record and trial transcript show that the Christensen-
Abbott joint venture, from its inception through its operation 
by Christensen to its conclusion, was loosely and ineptly handled, 
with a bare minimum of writings to document it (R-136), with 
great faith and trust by Abbott (R-242,243). 
Appellant argues in Points III and IV of his brief that the 
Haslem contract Assignment and Assumption Agreement dated April 28, 
1976 (Exh.P-4) was a final, complete, integrated contract; that 
parol evidence should not have been allmved to vary that writing; 
thus allowing appellant to come around at a later date to sue on 
the black Angus separate note. 
Respondent agrees with the general rule that a completely 
incegrated agreement or final memorandum cannot generally be 
varied by parol evidence. This rule is spelled out in the numer-
ous cases cited by appellant; particularly, State Bank of Lehi v. 
\~oolsey (1977) (Utah) 525 P2d 602, and Rainford v. Rytting (1969) 
22 U/.d 252, 451 P2d 769 and Lamb v. Bangart (1974)(Utah) 525 P2d 602. 
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Bullfrog l1arina, Inc. v. Lentz (1972) 28 U2d 261, 501 P2d 
266, addresses the real and only issue now before this court; 
that is, what is a final, complete, integrated writing? The 
court answered this saying: 
Whenever a litigant insists that a writing 
that is before the court is an integration 
and asks the application of the parol evi-
dence rule, the court must determine as a 
question of fact whether the parties did 
in fact adopt a particular writing or 
writings as the final and complete expres-
sion of their bargain. In determining the 
issue of the completeness of the integra-
tion in writing, evidence extrinsic to the 
writing itself is admissible. Parol testi-
mony is admissable to show the circumstances 
under which the agreement was ~ade and the 
purpose for which the instrument was executed. 
In Bullfrog Marina the trial court's determination, that a 
lease, a separate employment contract and other evidence of the 
parties' whole intention should all be considered together, was 
affirmed. 
Abbott testified as to his understanding of the settlement 
of the entire joint ranching operation, with execution of the 
Haslem contract assignment and assumption agreement (~xh.P-4) 
as one part of the whole (R-241), and he testified as to the 
execution of that document as follo>lS (R-242,243): 
A On this day this was the final day before 
foreclosure on the Blue !!ountain Ranch and an 
injunction against Paul and I, you know, for 
the whole thing. I came out to Duchesne, went 
and talked to Paul and took him the papers to 
sign to settle the whole thing, and those 
papers had been prepared by you to deed every-
thing over to me, and we agreed about the 
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division. He was to take half the cows, 
I got half the cows, and that canceled the 
note, and I gave those to him and he said, 
he had to go see George Hangan before he 
would sign anything. George was his part-
ner on the Blue Hountain Ranch. He put 
in forty thousand dollars. 
A Yes. And so I gave him (Christensen) the 
papers and he went to l!r. Hangan' s office 
in Roosevelt and then I went to Roosevelt 
and waited there about three hours, and 
then he came back with this. (Indicating) 
THE COURT: By "this" you !lEaii. Exhibit 4? 
A Exhibit 4, yes, sir. And brought it up, and 
I looked at this and, you kno~v, our previous 
full agreement had been I would take over 
those payments of the one hundred three 
thousand one year, the sixty-eight thousand 
the next year, and the half of about another 
thirty-five thousand back payments, fifty-six 
thousand dollars of back interest and thirty-
eight thousand of current interest, and in 
settling this out he would--and all this was 
to apply on that note or my half of the cows. 
I got two hundred and he got t~vo hundred. The 
color didn't make any difference. He was taking 
the red ones, so the black ones were then mine, 
and he was supposed to tear up the note. But 
this wasn't put in this thing. So Mr. Draney 
brought it in and handed this to me and said 
that, "Your la~vyer said you were supposed to 
sign this." And I looked at it, and, of course, 
read it through and saw that I was assigning 
them the Haslem cattle, which is fine, but I 
was getting the black ones which they didn't 
put in, and I said to Paul at that time, "~low 
I ~.;ill go ahead and sign this thing if you 
will simply go ahead and keep our oral agree-
ment and let me have the black cows and tear 
up that note and no more tricks." And he said, 
"Fine." So I signed it. 
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Dennis Draney testified that he was the law partner of 
George Mangan, appellant's attorney, in 1976 (R-292); that he 
prepared the Haslem contract assignment and assumption instru-
ment for Christensen; and that he delivered the instrument to 
Abbott for his execution (R-291). At that point in the trial, 
Judge Sorensen asked George Mangan if he had a financial inter-
est in the Christensen-Abbott operation, and ~Iangan answered 
in the affirmative (R-292). Draney then admitted that he had 
a financial interest in the Haslem ranch because of his member-
ship in an investment club with Eangan (R-294). Draney then 
testified that about $45,000 or $50,000 had been borrowed by 
the club for a down payment on the Haslem ranch deal (R-294,295). 
The Haslem contract "Assignment and Assumption Agreement" 
(Exh. P-4) was clearly and simply an instrument of transfer of 
purchaser Christensen's interest in the Haslem real property and 
44 head of cattle to Abbott, with assumption by Abbott of the 
obligations under the Haslem contract. 
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee (1957) 6 U2d 98, 
306 P2d 773, and Mathis v. Madsen (1953) 1 U2d 46, 261 P2d 952, 
both hold that the intent of parties to an agreement should be 
ascertained first from the four corners of the instrument itself, 
second from other contemporaneous writings concerning the same 
subject matter, and third from extrinsic parol evidence of the 
intentions. Under the rule of those Utah cases, the Haslem 
contract "Assignment and Assumption Agreement" must be 
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construed from the language within the four corners of that 
document as a simple instrument of transfer. 
The testimony of Abbott as set out above (R-241-243) clearly 
shows his intention and understanding that there was no complete 
or integrated writing which finalized the whole ranching opera-
tion settlement. Christensen agreed with Judge Sorensen's sum-
marization that on April 28, 1976 the business arrangement came 
to an end, the "business venture flopped" and it was being wound 
up then (R-304). 
Continental Bank v. Bybee, supra, involved a situation 
where the attorney who drafted the questioned agreement was also 
a party to it. The Utah court held that under such circumstances 
the proper construction of the instrument should be strictly c~trued 
against him. Guinand v. Walton (1969) 22 U2d 196, 450 P2d 467, 
held that a document drawn up by defendants through their attorney 
had to be strictly construed against defendants. Skousen v. 
~ (1972) 27 U2d 169, 493 P2d 1003 held: "It is axiomatic 
that language in a written instrument is interpreted more strongly 
against a scrivener who evecutes it." 
The Haslem contract "Assignment and Assumption Agreement;' 
was prepared by Dennis Draney, the law partner of Christensen's 
attorney, and both Draney and George Hangan admitted having very 
substantial financial interests in the Haslem ranch purchase 
with Christensen. Certainly that instrument must be construed 
strictly as to what it really was; that is, an instrument of 
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Now I will go ahead and sign this thing 
if you will simply go ahead and keep our 
oral agreement and let me have the black 
cows and tear up that note and no more 
tricks. And he said, 'Fine.' So I signed it. 
No objection was made to this testimony. The transcript 
is devoid of any objection by appellant to any testimony or 
evidence on the ground of varying any writing by parol evidence. 
Pettingill v. Perkins (1954) 2 U2d 266, 272 P2d 185, held: 
Generally, appellate courts will not review 
a ground of objection not urged in the trial 
court. 3 Am.Jur.ll6, Appeal and Error, 381. 
The duty is incumbent upon counsel to give 
the trial court the opportunity to correct 
the error before asking the appellate court 
to reverse a verdict and judgment thereon. 
Pettingill was followed, and the language quoted above was 
approved, in Steele v. \.Jilkinson (1960) 10 U2d 159, 349 P2d 1117, 
and Porcupine Reservoir Co. v. Keller Corp. (1964) 15 U2d 318, 
392 P2d 620. 
Appellant's arguments in Points III and IV of his brief 
are raised for the first time on this appeal, which is improper, 
and those arguments cannot now be heard. 
POINT III. 
SATISFACTIOil OF THE ABBOTT TO CHRISTENSEN 
BLACK ANGUS NOTE WAS ONE OTHER FACET OF THE 
CONPLETE ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 
Appellant's com?laint (R-1) sought (1) recovery on the 
$111,000 Abbott to Christensen note on the purchase by Abbott 
of the 200 black An3us cattlE:, (2) costs of care of those same 
cattle by Christensen, and (3) recovery of $5,000 for BLM 
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grazing fees paid by Christensen as an expense of the Haslem 
ranch operation. Appellant has obviously abandoned his third 
cause for relief, as he has not pursued it in this appeal. 
Respondent's answer to each of appellant's alleged causes for 
relief was the full accord and satisfaction, which required con-
sideration and inclusion of the note, all joint ranching opera-
tion expenses and the Haslem ranch equity and obligations. Und& 
this Point III respondent will limit argument to the matter of 
the note as a part of the whole settlement, and under Point IV 
the costs of black Angus care will be considered. 
Foreclosure on the Haslem ranch mortgage was immediately 
impending on April 28, 1976, and Abbott testified (R-241) that 
for him to assume the Haslem obligations "the note was to be 
torn up." His testimony at R-242 and 243 is quoted in full 
under Point II A. , ~vhere he said unequivocally that for him to 
make final settlement and assume the debts the note was to be 
cancelled. 
In assuming the delinquencies on the Haslem mortgage, 
Abbott had to immediately make the payment due on January l, 
1975 of $125,027.95, the payment due on January l, 1976 of 
$68,160.00 (Exh. P-35) and interest to April 28, 1976 of 
$8,753.32, less $20,000, which had been paid on interest (R-213), 
or a total delinquencies of $181,941.27. As consideration for 
this debt assumption and as part of the whole settlement, Abbott 
was to have cancellation of the $111,000 note, with a division 
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of the red Haslem cattle, with 44 to Abbott and the remainder 
of 250, or 206, to Christensen (R-242). During the ranch 
operation, Abbott had paid $11,945 (Exhs. 5,6,7,8 and 9). 
Abbott testified that these payments were intended to apply on 
the note, although a check to Les Herman for $4,445 (Exh.5) was 
marked for hay (R-114,115,135). Christensen testified that the 
same five payments were to apply on purchase of hay for the 
joint venture (R-171). 
Abbott emphatically denied that the Haslem ranch assignment 
and assumption (Exh. P-4) applied solely to the Haslem deal in 
the final settlement (R-116), and he continued to show that his 
assumption of the Haslem delinquencies and continuing obligation 
more than satisfied the note in the final settlement (R-117). 
After the final settlement on April 28, no demand was made 
by Christensen on Abbott on the note until the present suit was 
commenced on July 23, 1976 for the full $111,000 and interest 
(R.-249). 
The obvious complete lack of current accounting or docu-
mentation by the parties, and particularly by Christensen who 
was the operator during the ranch operation for tvlO years, as 
demonstrated during the two-day trial, with a total mishmash of 
testimony, caused Judge Sorensen to conclude in his Memorandum 
Decision (R-40) : 
It vmuld appear that, no matter what the 
business arrangement was between the parties 
prior to April 28, 1976, on that date_both 
parties concluded the business had fa~led, 
and they therefore settled bet"\veen them a 
division of the property and debts. 
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The trial court's finding that the $111,000 note was satis-
fied as part of the whole settlement must be affirmed as require( 
by the general rule for appellate review. The Utah court in 
Paulsen v. Coombs, supra, held: 
The question of whether evidence is suffi-
cient to be clear and convincing is primarily 
for the trial court; his finding should not 
be disturbed unless we must say as a matter 
of law that no one could reasonably find the 
evidence to be clear and convincing. 
POINT IV. 
ANY MONEY OWING BY ABBOTT TO CHRISTENSEN 
FOR CARE OF ANY CATTLE HAS SETTLED AND 
SATISFIED AS A PART OF THE C0!1PLETE 
ACCORD AND SATISFACTIOU. 
The second cause of action in appellant's complaint (R-1) 
was h~s claim for $37,200, limited to care of Abbott's 200 black 
Angus cattle from l1arch, 1974 to July 4, 1976. Appellant pro-
ceeded by Order to Show Cause (R-16) to enforce an agistor's 
lien, asking sale of ::he black Angus cattle and their calves. 
The parties thereafter stipulated that those cattle should be 
sold under direction of Abbott, with the sale proceeds to be 
deposited in a joint bank account and to be released only on 
order of the court (R-35). The sale was made, and the proceeds 
of sale were deposited in such joint bank account. The judg-
ment of the trial court (R-43) awarded the proceeds of the bank 
account to Abbott. 
Abbott testified that the operation of the ranch was entire! 
pursuant to oral agreements, whereby Christensen would run all 
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of the cattle, black and red, and would pay all expenses of 
operation and in return would receive one-half of the calf crop 
(R-239,259), and that Christensen did in fact receive his share 
of the calves (R-146,155,156 and 164). Christensen testified 
that he received one-half of the calf crop (R-185) from both 
black Angus and red Haslem cattle (R-172), and that the expenses, 
including wages, were to be equally split (R-168,200). 
Christensen's complaint is a claim for care for only the 
200 black Angus. Christensen's proof of operating expenses 
paid by him went to the total operation (Exhs. P-31, P-32 and 
D-33), without any proof of actual expenses for care of the 
black Angus. Christensen testified then that one-half of the 
expenses '"ere his (R-ll9 ,120), thus oaking his proof entirely 
inconsistent with his claim. 
After two days of this prolifera of testimony, the trial 
court found that on April 28, 1976 "the parties settled and 
agreed between themselves to a division of the property and 
the debts of said business operation," and then concluded that 
"there was an accord and satisfaction between the parties" 
(R-41) . 
Appellant complains in Point V of his brief that Judge 
Sorensen did not r.Jake detailed findings "of the necessary 
elements" of the accord and satisfaction. In State of Utah in 
the interest of K.D.S. (1978)(Utah) 587 P2d 9, Judge Ellett 
answered a contention that insufficient findings of fact and 
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Conclusions of LaH had been entered by the trial court, citing 
to In re Clift's Estate, 70 U.409, 260 P.859, and saying: 
7he test for Rule 52(a) is whether or not 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law indicate clearly the mind of the 
court even though they are not in the 
artistic form of approved models. 
Hojave Uranium Co. v. Hesa Petroleum Co. (1969) 22 U.2d 239, 
451 P.2d 587, involved a problem of "elusiveness of the record," 
like in the instant case, where the trial court did not make 
detailed findings or conclusions. The Utah court stated: 
This court, in many cases has indulsed 
the ;:>resumption that where the trial 
court did not make a specific finding on 
a particular phase of a case, that if 
such finding had been made it would be 
in harmony with the decision rendered. 
Probably the best statement of this 
proposition was made by t!r. Justice 
Wade in lfower '1. t1cCarthy .122 Utah 1, 245 
P. 2d 224 (1952), ~•here it was stated 
that, 'In reviewing a case of this kind 
where issues of fact are involved and 
there are no findings of fact, we do 
not review the facts but assume that the 
trier of the facts found them in accord 
with its decision, and we affirm the 
decision if from the evidence it would 
be reasonable to find facts to support it.' 
Judge Sorensen had before him a conflict of testimony as 
to the basic ranch operating arrangement, a dispute as to where 
and in what amounts payments by Abbott had or should have been 
applied; that is, on the An8us note or on ranch operations, and 
a disagreeoent as to which cattle, red or black, were intended 
to be divided on the final settlement. The parties were in 
agreement that a final settlement of the entire ranch operation 
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was intended and in fact was cons~ated on April 28, 1976. 
The trial court's findings and judgment must be affirmed. 
POIHT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND JUDGHENT 
SHOULD BE RESPECTED ON APPELLATE REVIEH 
The rule of respect for the trial court's findings and 
conclusions on appellate review is last firmly~ated by the Utah 
court in Fisher v. Taylor (1977)(Utah) 572 P.2d 393: 
This Court has consistently followed 
the well-recognized standard of appellate 
review which precludes the substitution 
of our judgment for that of the trial 
court on issues of fact, and where its 
findings and judgment are based on sub-
stantial, competent, admissible evidence 
we 1vill not disturb them. 
In Wash-A-~1atic v. Rupp (l975)(Utah) 532 P.2d 682, in a 
case involving contradictory evidence of the parties to a sales 
contract, the Utah court said: 
The evidence was sufficient to sustain 
the judgment made, and we should sus-
tain the trial court even if we might 
have come to a different decision had 
r.ve been trying the matter. 
The Utah court has always followed the general rule of the 
Memmott case, supra, under Point I, that on appeal the evidence 
before the trial court must be reviewed in the light most favor-
able to sustain the findings of the trial court. This is the 
consistent holding of the Utah court in the Page, Northcrest, Inc. 
and Paulsen cases, cited supra by respondent in Point I. The 
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Utah court said in Prudential Federal Savings v. Hartford Ace. & 
Ind. Co. (1958) 7 U2d 366, 325 P2d 899: 
Inasmuch as the trial court found in 
favor of the plaintiffs, they are 
entitled to have us review the evidence 
and every reasonable inference fairly 
to be drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to them. 
Judge Sorensen heard two days of detailed testimony and had 
the full opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses 
and of their testimony. His ultimate findings and judgment was 
that there was a complete accord and satisfaction between the 
parties, and he dismissed appellant's attempt to renege on that 
agreement. The trial court's findings and judgment must be 
affirmed 
CONCLUSION 
The only issue before this court is whether there was 
sufficient, competent and credible evidence to support the trial 
court's findings that there had been an accord and satisfaction 
between the parties, which settled and divided the properties 
and debts of the joint ranching venture. 
The trial court's findings and judgment, after a two-day 
trial, were that the parties had been in a joint business ven-
ture, which had failed; that on April 28, 1976 the parties set-
tled between themselves a division of the property and debts 
of the ranching operation, thus constituting an accord and 
satisfaction; and that Christensen had no cause of action 
against Abbott on the black Angus note or for care of those 
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particular cattle, whereas those matters were merged in the 
accord and satisfaction. 
The trial court's findings and judgment must be respected 
and affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Wallace D. Hur 
/ for Respondent 
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